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Wunschel: The Parol Evidence Rule in West Virginia--When Is a Writing Compl

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN WEST VIRGINIA
WHEN IS A WRITING COMPLETE?

-

When in an action or suit one of the parties to a writing seeks
to introduce prior or contemporaneous negotiations into the controversy he is confronted with a general prohibitory rule of law,
which, as the West Virginia cases commonly put it, excludes parol
evidence tending to vary, contradict or add to the terms of a complete and unambiguous written instrument. 2 It is believed that
this rule, however stated, is applicable only when the writing is
3
complete, i. e., integrated into a single memorial by the parties.
If, therefore, this rule operates to exclude all such extraneous
matters only in the single instance of the completeness of the
writing or integration, it would seem that the initial inquiry by
the court would necessarily be: Is the writing complete or has
the extraneous matter been integrated? Whether the extraneous
agreement will be given legal effect or declared legally immaterial,
will depend upon the test adopted by the court with respect to
this fundamental question. 4
In two recent West Virginia cases it would seem that the
court has enunciated two somewhat different tests which, if applied
to the same factual situation, might conceivably produce results
quite irreconcilable. In O'Farreflv. Virginia Public Service Company,5 the court in dealing with the question of the integration
of a certain alleged contemporaneous oral agreement seemed, in
effect, to take the position that if the alleged oral agreement
varied the written one and the latter was unambiguous," legal
1 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2400: "First and foremost the
rule is in no sense a rule of evidence, but a rule of substantive law. It does
not exclude certain data because they are for one or another reason untrustworthy or undesirable means of evidencing some fact to be proved." Cohn v.
Dunn, 111 Conn. 342, 149 Atl. 851 (1930).
20 'Farrell v. Virginia Public Service Co. . 177 S. E. 304 (W. Va. 1934);
Anderson v. Hyman, 133 W. Va. 760, 169 S. E. 741 (1933); Capital City Bank
v. Foster, 112 W. Va. 520, 165 S.E. 802 (1932) ; Tabler v. Hoult, 110 W. Va.
542, 158 S.E. 782 (1931) ; Jones v. Kessler, 98 W. Va. 1, 126 S. E. 512 (1925);
Long v. Perine, 41 W. Va. 315, 23 S. E. 611 (1895).
3 Complete in the sense that the integration though not necessarily including all negotiations of the parties, covers or includes the particular utterance
which is sought to be introduced. Corns-Thomas Company v. County Court,
92 W. Va. 368, 375, 115 S. E. 462 (1922), "When a writing bears evidence of
incompleteness on its face, oral evidence is admissable to supply the missing
or omitted element or factor;" Erie City Iron Works v. Miller Supply Co.,
68 W. Va. 519, 70 S. E. 125 (1911); Rymer v. South Penn Oil Co., 54 W. Va.
530, 46 S. E. 559 (1904); Johnson v. Burns, 39 W. Va. 658, 20 S. E. 686
(1894).
4 5 WIO1ortE, EVIDENOE n. 1, § 2430.
5Supra n. 2.
o It is believed that "unambiguous", as used, is synonymous with complete-
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effect could not be given to the extraneous negotiation. 7 In City
of Wheeling v. Benwooc & McMechen Water Company," the
question at bar was whether or not a prior written agreement of
the parties had been merged into or superseded by a subsequent
written agreement, i. e., whether the subsequent agreement was
a complete integration of the negotiations of the parties. Upon
this occasion the court said whether or not integration had taken
place depended upon the intent of the parties.
In many jurisdictions the technique of the O'Farrell case is
employed and the completeness of the writing is determined solely
from an inspection of the writing itself.10 Apart from certain
questions which may arise where the law requires a particular
legal act to be in writing, it would seem that integration is not
legally necessary. 1 ' Hence in such a case the question should be
whether the parties intended to integrate in the first instance.1 "
Whether the parties intended the writing to embody their entire
agreement or only a part thereof, should be determined, it is said,
from their conduct and language and the surrounding facts and
ness for in any other connection it would have, it is submitted, no significance
as a part of the role of integration. "If the terms of a written contract
imply completeness there is a presumption generally conclusive, that the writing contains the entire agrement." O'Farrell v. Virginia Public Service Co.,
supra n. 2, syl. 1.
7 Apparently the court admitted the parol agreement and by comparison
with the writing found that there was a variance, then held that the parol
stipulation had no legal effect and that the trial court did not err in striking
out the testimony as to this matter.
8 176 S. E. 234 (W. Va. 1934).
9 "Both parties themselves initially placed this construction on their arrangeTheir conduct indicates that they regarded the subsequent writing
ment ....
more as a confirmation of their earlier agreement than as an integration of
the contract." (Italics supplied.)
10 In Baude & McDonnell Co. v. Cohen Co., 87 W. Va. 763, 106 S. E. 52
(1921), it was said that where the instrument appears complete on its face
there is a presumption that it contains the whole of the agreement and this
presumption is generally conclusive; Jones v. Kessler, supra n. 2, goes even
farther (that the test of completeness is the writing itself) ; Stephan v. Lagerqvest, 52 Cal. App. 519, 199 Pac. 52 (1921); Armstrong Paint & Varnish
Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, 133 N. E. 711 (1921); Thompson
v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885); Brantinghain v. Hough, 174 N.
Y. 53, 66 N. E. 620 (1903); Ruppert v. Singhi, 243 N. Y. 156, 153 N. E. 33
(1926); Newark v. Mills, 35 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Seitz v. Brewers Refrigerating Co., 144 U. S. 510, 12 S. Ct. 46 (1891).
115 WIGx0RE, EvonNcp § 2430: 'Whether a particular subject of negotiation is embodied by the writing depends wholly upon the intent of the parties
thereto. In this respect the contrast is between voluntary integration and integration by law. Hence the parties are not obliged to embody their transaction
in a single document; yet they may if they choose. Hence it becomes merely
a question whether they have intended to do so."
1 Cohn v. Dunn, supra n. 1; Danielson v. Bank of Scandinavia, 201 Wis.
392, 230 N. W. 83 (1930); "The admissibility of parol evidence to show
terms of a contract other than have been reduced to writing depends upon
whether or not the writing was intended by the parties to embody the entire

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss3/8

2

Wunschel: The Parol Evidence Rule in West Virginia--When Is a Writing Compl

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

275

circumstances," s excluding, as a rule, direct statements by the
parties as to what they may or may not have intended."
Certain tests have been suggested to determine whether or
not the parties intended to make a complete integration."5 The
chief and most reliable appears to be whether or not the particular
element of the alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all
in the writing. If it is mentioned, covered or dealt with, then
supposedly the writing was meant to include that element. If it
is not dealt with in the writing then the instrument was probably
not intended to cover that phase of the negotiation. Consequently
in the latter event legal effect may in general be given to the
extraneous matter, while in the former such matter should be declared legally immaterial.18 While not an absolute criterion and
while subject to an inherent indefiniteness making uniformity of
result unlikely,17 it is only one of perhaps numerous methods of
arriving at the intention of the parties. In any event, to repeat,
%hesurrounding facts and circumstances should be considered as
indices of what the parties may have intended.
F, Wu2scnEL.
-WnmIu
transaction, and so to constitute the sole evidence of their agreement." 5
VIGmORE, EvmENcE, § 2430.
"3Danielson v. Bank of Scandinavia, supra n. 12; I'In considering whether
the parties intended a written contract to be an integration of their entire
transaction so as to render inadmissible parol evidence of such additional
terms of agreement, the subject matter and surrounding circumstances may
and should be taken into consideration." Accord Cohn v. Dunn, supra n. 12;
J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., v. Buick Motor Co., 39 F. (2d) 305 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1930); 5 WIGMORE, EViDENCE, § 2430.
Such statements are barred by the rule
14 5 WioMoan EvRmnc , § 2471.

of integration itself; and quite often by a statutory requirement, as in the case
of wills. However there are exceptions wherein such declarations are admissible: (1) to interpret an equivocation, i. e., a term, which upon application
to external objects, is found to fit two or more of them equally. Id. § 2472,
p. 409; In re Ray. Cant v. Johnstone (1915) 1 Ch. 461; Il re Crawley.
Robertson v. Flynn (1920) 1 Ir. R. 78. To the effect that the term must fit
two or more objects equally accurately, Doe d. Simon Hiscocks v. John Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363 (1839); Drake v. Drake, 8 H. L. Cas. 172 (1860).
(2) See Collins v. Treat, 108 W. Va. 443, at 446, 152 S. E. 205 (1930).
Declarations of intention are admissible to explain a latent ambiguity i. e.,
where the instrument upon its face appears clear, but there is some collateral
matter which makes the meaning uncertain; but not admissible where the
ambiguity is patent.
-a The criterion of completeness is the writing itself, Thompson v. Libby,
34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885); Armstrong Paint Works v. Continental
Can Co., supra n. 10; Dawson County Bank v. Durland, 114 Neb. 605, 209 N.
W. 243 (1926) ; (stating the test to be how. closely the oral contract is bound
to the writing) Roof v. Jerd, 102 Vt. 129, 146 At]. 250 (1929); (test of
admissibility whether the oral agreement is one which the parties would not
ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing) Mitchell v. Lath, 247 N. Y.
(1928).
E. 646 supra
160 N.
377,
13 Cohn
v. Dunn,
n. 1; Danielson v. Bank of Scandinavia, supra n. 12;
5 WI MORE, EVIDENCE, § 2430.
17 Note (1931) 70 A. L. R. 761.
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